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With the Doha round in trouble, the so-called “spaghetti bowl” of multilateral trade rules
and proliferating regional trade deals is, once again, prominently on the radar screen of
the international trade community. Perfect examples of this image are the longstanding
US-Canada softwood lumber and US-Mexico sweetener disputes. Both trade spats,
extensively litigated in NAFTA and the WTO, are close to reaching a climax. Fueling
the suspense is that the WTO and NAFTA may reach different results.

1.

The spaghetti bowl of WTO and NAFTA proceedings

On 15 November 2005, a WTO panel accepted a US finding that Canadian imports of
softwood lumber threaten to cause material injury to US competitors.2 Earlier this year,
however, on 10 August 2005, a NAFTA Extraordinary Challenge Committee confirmed
an earlier (Chapter 19) NAFTA panel conclusion that the evidence on record does not
support a finding of threat of material injury.3 With NAFTA finding in favor of Canada
(that is, no threat of material injury, hence no US right to either antidumping or
counterveiling duties), and the WTO finding in favor of the United States, what is next?
Can the United States maintain its extra duties on Canadian lumber (currently averaging
20.15 %) or must the duties be withdrawn and/or repaid? If the latter, must the United
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States refund the full, or only part of, the amount of what so far adds up to over US $4.2
billion?

Additional proceedings are pending, not on injury, but on whether Canada is dumping or
subsidizing lumber in the first place. The US determination of subsidy has been
condemned five times by a NAFTA Chapter 19 panel4 and three times by the WTO, most
recently in an Appellate Body report of 5 December 2005.5 Implementing the latest
NAFTA ruling on subsidization, the United States, on 22 November 2005, reduced its
determination of subsidy from an original 19 % to a 0.8 % de minimis level.6 The US
determination of dumping, in turn, has been the subject of three negative NAFTA
Chapter 19 rulings7 and one negative WTO Appellate Body report.8 US redeterminations, which continue to find dumping (in some cases at higher levels than
beforehand), are currently under review in both fora.

Similarly, for more than 5 years now, the United States has blocked the selection of
panelists on a NAFTA (Chapter 20) panel to examine the legality of US quotas on
Mexican cane sugar under a sugar-specific NAFTA annex.9 In contrast, when Mexico
imposed anti-dumping duties against US imports of high-fructose corn syrup (an
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alternative sweetener predominantly produced in the United States), a WTO panel swiftly
condemned the Mexican duties.10 More importantly, when Mexico responded, in 2002,
with an extra 20 % tax on soft drinks using sweeteners other than cane sugar, the United
States promptly obtained a WTO panel. Notwithstanding Mexican arguments that the
broader sweetener dispute -- that is, both the US quotas and the Mexican tax in response - ought to be decided under NAFTA or that, in the alternative, the WTO should accept
the tax as a valid countermeasure to induce US compliance with NAFTA, on 7 October
2005, a WTO panel found the tax to be discriminatory in violation of GATT.11 With the
United States allegedly violating NAFTA (through sugar quotas and/or blocking the
establishment of a panel roster12) and, in response, Mexico violating the WTO, what is
next? Must Mexico withdraw the discriminatory tax or can it rely on NAFTA (or general
international law on countermeasures) to keep it in place?

Finally, as if the picture was not yet complex enough, three Canadian lumber companies
(Canfor, Tembec and Terminal) have, in their capacities as investors in the United States,
invoked the investor-state dispute mechanism of NAFTA Chapter 11. They claim, inter
alia, that US treatment of Canadian lumber imports is discriminatory and constitutes
“indirect expropriation”. Together, they seek a total of US $540 million in compensation
from the US government. Avoiding further risk of inconsistent rulings (this time within
Chapter 11 of NAFTA), on 7 September 2005, a NAFTA panel consolidated these three
requests in one single proceeding.13 Similarly, three US sweetener companies (Corn
Products International, Archer Daniels and Tate & Lyle) initiated proceedings against
10
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Mexico under NAFTA Chapter 11. They claim, inter alia, that the Mexican tax is
discriminatory and constitutes “indirect expropriation”. Together, they seek a total of US
$425 million in compensation from the Mexican government. Unlike the lumber cases,
however, on 20 May 2005, a NAFTA tribunal refused to consolidate these requests.14 As
a result, two parallel proceedings, by two completely different Chapter 11 tribunals, are
now examining the same Mexican tax.

What if these NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals come out differently, or find one thing and
the WTO (or, for that matter, tribunals operating under other NAFTA Chapters), another?
Indeed, of the 40 notices of arbitration filed under NAFTA Chapter 11, a majority relates
to standard trade policies that could have been brought before the WTO (or NAFTA trade
chapters).15 The complex interaction between investment and trade dispute settlement
proceedings is only in its infant stage. In environment-related disputes, the situation may
be even more complex, through intersections with NAFTA’s side agreement on the
environment. This side agreement enables anyone living in any of the three NAFTA
countries to petition a factual investigation into whether a NAFTA party is effectively
enforcing its own environmental law.16 At least one investor found it useful to seek such
investigation in the context of its NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute.17
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2.

Untangling the strings

The short term answer to the questions raised above is that both the October WTO panel
on sweeteners and the November WTO panel on softwood lumber will be appealed to the
WTO Appellate Body. The result of such appeals can then be expected somewhere
around March or April of 2006.

The long term answer is more complicated. Although clearly dealing with the same
broader dispute on lumber or sweeteners, the different rulings out of NAFTA and/or the
WTO are not, strictly speaking, in a relation of res judicata. Traditionally, for the
principle of res judicata to apply and, therefore, for two rulings to be genuinely in
conflict, the overlapping proceedings must involve (1) the same parties, (2) the same
subject matter, and (3) the same legal claims.

Most obviously, as concerns the first requirement (“same parties”), the NAFTA Chapter
11 cases are between private investors and the US/Mexican government. In contrast, the
WTO and NAFTA Chapter 19 and 20 cases are between governments. Under NAFTA
Chapter 11, private investors have standing.

At the WTO and under NAFTA trade

chapters, however, standing is reserved to state parties (not private traders).18

Considering the second requirement (“same subject matter”), the NAFTA lumber panel
rejecting a US finding of threat of material injury was made with reference to a US
determination of May 2002.19 In contrast, the WTO lumber panel accepting a US finding
of threat of material injury relates to a December 2004 re-determination concerning the
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same period of investigation but made on the basis of a different (i.e., reopened) record.20
Equally, the specific subject matter of the blocked NAFTA panel on sweeteners is: US
quotas on Mexican cane sugar. In contrast, the subject matter of the WTO sweeteners
panel is: a Mexican tax on sweeteners other than cane sugar.

Finally, the different proceedings do not exactly involve the same legal claims (third
requirement for res judicata). WTO panels examine claims of violation of WTO rules.
NAFTA Chapter 11 and 20 panels (such as the blocked sweetener panel) examine claims
of violation of NAFTA. Crucially, whilst the WTO lumber panel accepting a US finding
of threat of material injury did so pursuant to WTO rules, the NAFTA Chapter 19 panel
rejecting a US finding of threat of material injury did so pursuant to the United States
own trade laws. Indeed, the applicable law under NAFTA Chapter 19 is not NAFTA but
the domestic law of the defending country.

Nonetheless, the absence of res judicata should not lead one tribunal to completely
ignore the work of the other.

Firstly, WTO panels must carefully examine whether NAFTA proceedings do not
preclude the WTO’s jurisdiction (and vice versa). As far as normal trade panels under
NAFTA Chapter 20 are concerned, for example, (to be distinguished from NAFTA
Chapter 19, dealing exclusively with dumping and subsidies) NAFTA Article 2005
explicitly provides that “disputes” regarding a “matter” arising under both NAFTA and
the WTO can be brought to either forum. However, once “procedures have been
initiated” at either forum (there does not seem to be a need for an actual panel), the forum
selected shall be used (either by the complainant or the defendant, it would seem) “to the
exclusion of the other”. In the WTO sweetener panel, however, neither Mexico nor the
panel referred to NAFTA Article 2005. Similarly, in the lumber dispute (brought before
20
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both NAFTA Chapters 19 and 11), NAFTA explicitly regulates the interaction between
NAFTA Chapter 11 investment disputes and NAFTA Chapter 19 antidumping and
subsidy disputes. NAFTA Article 1901 states that nothing in Chapter 11 “shall be
construed as imposing obligations” with respect to US “antidumping law or
counterveiling duty law”. This clause will be a difficult hurdle to overcome for the
Canadian lumber companies in their (consolidated) Chapter 11 tribunal.21

Secondly, even if different proceedings can advance in parallel (or sequentially) without
res judicata triggered and with no other hurdles elsewhere in either treaty, a WTO panel
still ought to take cognizance of a NAFTA panel’s analysis (and vice versa), as well as
factor in the risk of inconsistent rulings. Double recovery should also be avoided.
Showing no sense of such “judicial comity”, the November WTO lumber panel, however,
does not make a single reference to the concurrent NAFTA Chapter 19 proceedings.
Similarly, in the sweetener dispute both the WTO and NAFTA are faced with claims of
violation of national treatment (albeit under different legal provisions). Hence, one
would expect, for example, that when the NAFTA Chapter 11 panel examines NAFTA
Article 1102 on national treatment it would at least take cognizance of an earlier WTO
analysis, of the very same tax measure, under the GATT’s national treatment provision.22

3.

What is next?

Where does this leave the Mexican sugar industry and Canadian lumber producers, both
original complainants in these disputes?
21
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If confirmed by the WTO Appellate Body, Mexico will probably be forced -- under the
threat of US trade sanctions -- to end the 20 % tax (albeit only prospectively). In
addition, if the NAFTA Chapter 11 panels find against it, Mexico may have to pay close
to 500 million US$ in retrospective damages to US sweetener producers. WTO remedies
are, indeed, purely prospective, centered on bringing inconsistent measures in compliance
with WTO rules. In contrast, remedies under NAFTA Chapter 11 focus on the past and,
apart from monetary compensation, cannot force a government to change its future
conduct.23 None of this litigation, however, is likely to provide greater US market access
for Mexican sugar. To resolve this dispute, the United States ought to agree to a roster of
Chapter 20 panelists (a roster which, pursuant to NAFTA Article 2009, should have been
established more than 10 years ago). If so, the Chapter 20 panel which Mexico is asking
for since 2000 could be appointed by lot and proceed to examine the NAFTA conformity
of US quotas on Mexican sugar.24 Ironically, what has expanded market access for
Mexican sugar is not litigation, but the devastation caused by hurricanes Katrina and Rita
to sugar producers and refiners in Louisiana and Florida. Causing a shortage in domestic
sugar, these natural disasters forced the United States to dramatically increase import
quotas.25

As far as lumber is concerned, even if the WTO Appellate Body confirms that the
December 2004 US re-determination complies with WTO law, the fact remains that the
United States (pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 19) violated its very own laws, at least as
between May 2002 (date of imposition of the duties) and December 2004 (date of the redetermination), a period during which around US $3 billion were collected.26 In this
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context, it is instructive that Article 103 of NAFTA includes a general conflict clause in
favor of NAFTA in the event NAFTA provisions are inconsistent with GATT or other
agreements to which all NAFTA members are party.

Canada is now suing the United States before the US Court of International Trade to have
the duties removed and the deposits returned. In response, the US Coalition for Fair
Lumber Imports has challenged the constitutionality of NAFTA Chapter 19 before the
US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. If the United States refuses to comply
with NAFTA Chapter 19 -- that is, its own laws as interpreted by a NAFTA panel -Canada can request the establishment of a Special Committee under NAFTA Article
1905. If the Special Committee finds against the United States, Canada has the right to
suspend any NAFTA benefits v-a-v the United States “as appropriate under the
circumstances”.

Relief for Canadian lumber producers under NAFTA Chapter 19 may, therefore, not be
immediate, but (like the investment complaints under Chapter 11) it could operate
retroactively (at least from 2002 to 2004). As NAFTA Chapter 19 enforces domestic
(US) law, the remedies it provides have retrospective potential. In contrast, as pointed
out earlier, a WTO victory can only work prospectively and has never included a refund
of past duties collected.

Another difference in the remedies structure relates to the period and way to implement
adverse rulings. In NAFTA Chapter 19 there is, obviously, no appeal. The panel
remands the case “for action not inconsistent with the panel’s decision” and establishes
“as brief a time as is reasonable for compliance with the remand”.27 For the three
negative panel decisions in the lumber (injury) case, for example, this implementation
period was, respectively, 100, 21 and 10 days.28 Crucially, in quite a daring move, the
third of these panel reports did not content itself with a simple remand. In addition, the
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panel specifically precluded the US International Trade Commission (ITC) “from
undertaking yet another analysis of the substantive issues” and instructed that the ITC
determine “that the evidence on the record does not support a finding of threat of material
injury”.29 This made an end to a series of US re-determinations in September 2004. As
one concurring panelist put it: “Due process is not endless process … for the Panel to
postpone finality by issuing yet another open-ended remand instruction to the
Commission would be to allow the Chapter 19 process to become a mockery and an
exercise in futility”.30

The implementation of WTO panels, in contrast, takes considerably longer: WTO panels
can be appealed and only recommend that the Member concerned “bring the measure into
conformity”.31 The “reasonable period of time” to do so is not set by the panel itself, but
agreed on by the parties or determined in a separate arbitration.32 The guideline in such
arbitration is that this period should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of
the report. In the WTO lumber (injury) case, for example, the United States and Canada
fixed the implementation period at 10 months33 (a far cry from the 100, 21 and 10 days
under NAFTA Chapter 19). Crucially, the carousal of potentially endless redeterminations has so far not been stopped in any WTO proceeding. In contrast to
NAFTA, no WTO panel has specifically ordered a WTO Member to make a negative
finding on injury, dumping or subsidy. To make WTO dispute settlement more efficient,
thought should be given to shortening the procedures and implementation periods in
antidumping and counterveiling duty cases, along the lines of the expedited procedures
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for prohibited subsidies in the Subsidies Agreement.34 WTO panels could also make use
of their mandate in Article 19.2 of the DSU to “suggest ways in which the Member
concerned could implement the [panel’s] recommendations”35, suggestions that could, in
extreme cases, eventually match the NAFTA Chapter 19 panel’s specific instruction not
to find threat of injury.36 Thus tightening the WTO process may not be appropriate for
all WTO disputes. Yet given the purely prospective nature of WTO remedies, where
WTO Members can effectively impose any extra duties for free during at least 2 years,
the field of antidumping and counterveiling duties are prime candidates for such reform.

More immediately, in its second administrative review (deciding on actual assessments
for 2003-2004), released on 6 December 2005, the United States lowered the combined
duties on Canadian lumber from 20.15 % to 10.81 %.37 The latter figure will soon be
imposed also for new cash deposit rates for future shipments thus providing at least some
relief for Canadian lumber producers.

4.

Conclusion

The WTO-NAFTA spaghetti bowl is very real. To untangle it requires a complex and
open-minded analysis. Tools to facilitate such analysis are available in international law
(such as res judicata) and specific treaty provisions (such as NAFTA Article 2005).
Success will depend above all on a healthy degree of judicial tolerance and curiosity. For
private stakeholders the complexity is less attractive. In lumber and sweeteners, for
example, one guesses that by now only the law firms involved are enjoying the feast.
Treaty negotiators should keep this in mind and explicitly regulate potentially
34
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36
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overlapping jurisdictions. Remedy structures should equally avoid endless litigation.
Yet, at some stage, litigation reaches its limits. With the existing rulings in hand, and in
the shadow of never ending litigation, time may have come, in both the lumber and the
sweetener dispute, for comprehensive political settlements.
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